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To Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Revisiting Civil Religion 
Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle 
 
Americans live in a culture that is as religious as any that exists. In this article we contend that 
nationalism is the most powerful religion in the United States, and perhaps in many other countries.1 
Structurally speaking, nationalism mirrors sectarian systems of belief such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam 
and others that are more conventionally labeled as religious. It happens that nationalism also satisfies 
some of the most traditional definitions of religion, but citizens of nation-states have religious reasons for 
denying it. We argue that both sectarian and national religions organize killing energy by commuting 
devotees to sacrifice themselves to the group. We also briefly explore the ritual role of media in 
propagating national religion. Media are not the most important ritual vehicles for nationalism, but they 
matter. Though based in empirical observation, our claims are theoretical in nature.2 Their value lies in 
rethinking certain empirical phenomena in relation to notions of nationalism and religion in the 
contemporary world. Our examples come mostly from the United States and its majority sectarian faith. 
Although generalization is risky, the principles we describe are broadly applicable to other enduring 
groups, defined as those for which members are willing to give their lives. 
 By "religion" we mean a system of cosmological propositions grounded in a belief in a 
transcendent power expressed through a cult of divine being and giving rise to a set of ethical 
prescriptions.3  In the moral world shared by many readers, these prescriptions deplore violence and 
regard any use of it as prima facie profane. Where religious devotees unapologetically embrace violence, 
the faiths to which they subscribe may be considered morally flawed. Alternatively, it may be claimed 
that practitioners of violence who act in the name of religion have mistaken the true prescriptions of their 
faith. The familiar claim that a religious view of the world is characterized by a moral opposition to 
violence ignores a more complex reality in which faiths that most deeply bind the commitment of 
devotees are structures for organizing killing energy. This is true both for religions that aggressively kill 
the other in the name of a deity or deities and those that pledge their devotees to self-sacrifice when 
confronted with violence. We shall argue that violent and so-called non-violent religions are structurally 
indistinguishable from a certain perspective. 
 To equate nationalism and sectarianism unsettles champions of both Champions of nationalism 
see sectarianism as dangerous to nationalism's healthiest aspirations. Sectarianism, they fear, introduces 
passions that may manifest themselves in violence. They wish to separate church and state by 
subordinating the claims of the former to the latter Champions of sectarianism see nationalism as 
threatening to religious values, especially non-violence. The state, they say, is profane because it engages 
in violence. They wish to bend state claims to fundamental sectarian precepts.4  Perhaps nationalism and 
sectarianism recognize something about each other that they hesitate to recognize about themselves. Each 
fears that members of the other community are willing to kill and die for truth as they understand it. For 
what is really true in any community is what its members can agree is worth killing for, or what they can 
be compelled to sacrifice their lives for. The sacred is thus easily recognized. It is that set of beliefs and 
persons for which we ought to shed our own blood, if necessary, when there is a serious threat. Rituals 
that celebrate this blood sacrifice give expression and witness to faith. Sacrificial death thus defines both 
sectarian and national identity. This is the first sense in which both are species of religion. 
 On the whole, we misunderstand the genuinely religious character of American patriotism and the 
violent character of genuine religion. What distinguishes nationalism from sectarianism is not group logic, 
for both are religions of blood sacrifice. What distinguishes them is historical location. In the West 
Christianity once could kill and ask others to die in the name of its particular god. In some places it does 
this still. But in general in the West the power to compel believers to die passed from Christianity to the 
nation-state, where it largely remains. Christianity has no authorized guns within the boundaries of the 
United States, nor does any other denominational sect. In our religiously pluralist society sectarian faith is 
optional for citizens, as everyone knows. Though denominations are permitted to exist, they are not 
permitted to kill, for they are not officially true, which is a way of suggesting they are false. Only the true 
god, whose agent is the nation-state, may kill. The state allows whoever accepts these terms to exist, to 
pursue their own beliefs, and to call themselves what they like in the process. But only the deity may kill 
our own. Whoever competes with the true god, the nation-state, may be punished at the cost of his life. 
This was the fate of David Koresh, the leader of the ill-fated Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, for 
exercising killing power that not only belongs to the national god exclusively but defines him. In civil 
religious terms David Koresh's sin was blasphemy. 
 Americans traditionally regard the nation-state as the domain of unassailable force and religion as 
the domain of unassailable truth. This separation of faith and force is markedly unstable and collapses 
completely in wartime. Elsewhere, the more usual arrangement has been strongly forged links between 
spiritual and political power. This is because the only religion that can truly deliver the goods must have 
visible agency, worldly power. Jesus' disciples felt it, and a Weberian Protestant ethic suggests it. 
Wherever religion is fervently embraced, it follows in the minds of many believers that it is entitled to 
glory in missions of conquest that reflect God's will. Islam did this for centuries before European 
monarchies accomplished it for Christianity. And though religions have long survived and flourished in 
persecution and powerlessness, supplicants nevertheless take manifestations of power as blessed evidence 
of the truth of faith. 
If nationalism is religious, why do we deny it? Because what is obligatory for group members 
must be separated, as holy things are, from what is contestable. To concede that nationalism is a religion 
is to expose it to challenge, to make it just the same as sectarian religion. By explicitly denying that our 
national symbols and duties are sacred, we shield them from competition with sectarian symbols. In so 
doing, we embrace the ancient command not to speak the sacred, ineffable name of god. That god is 
inexpressible, unsayable, unknowable, beyond language. But that god may not be refused when it calls for 
sacrifice. 
 Among the handful of theorists who have seriously examined the religious character of American 
nationalism is Carlton Hayes, who argued that Western nationalism adapted many features of Christianity, 
in the shadow of which it first appeared. Citizens are born into the nation-state, Hayes observed, just as 
supplicants once were born into the Church. They have no choice but to be citizens, just as medieval 
Christians were compelled to embrace the faith of their birth. The social geographer Wilbur Zelinsky 
observes that the contemporary American flag has a visual power and presence for its believers that is 
comparable to the medieval crucifix (243). We agree. The flag in high patriotic ritual is treated with an 
awe and deference that marks it as the sacred object of the religion of patriotism. The flag is the skin of 
the totem ancestor held high. It represents the sacrificed bodies of its devotees just as the cross, the sacred 
object of Christianity, represents the body sacrificed to a Christian god. 
 The soldier carries his flag into battle as a sign of his willingness to die, just as Jesus earned his 
cross to show his willingness to die. Both the cross and the flag mark the border, the transformative point 
at which the believer crosses over into death. In both Christianity and nationalism the violently sacrificed 
body becomes the god renewed—in Durkheimian terms, the transformed totem. In Christianity the 
revivified totem is the risen Christ. In American nationalism the transformed totem is the soldier 
resurrected in the raised flag. On the basis of his sacrifice the nation is rejuvenated. As the embodiment of 
sacrifice, the flag has transforming power. Certain acts cannot be performed except in its presence. 
Elaborate rules govern what may touch it and how devotees must behave in its presence. It must be kept 
whole and perfect, as holy things are, and ceremonially disposed of when it is no longer fit to perform the 
functions of the totem object. 
Some citizens openly speak of the American flag as sacred. Can we disregard the impassioned 
testimony of others that it is not, and neither is the nation it represents? The answer lies in the ritual 
gestures that surround the flag. Roy Rappaport distinguishes ritual gesture from language, which is 
always other than that which it signifies. By contrast, gestures express what cannot be denied. What 
counts for the survival of the group is what we will do in public on its behalf while congregants bear 
witness. This is what the survival of the group requires: that we publicly execute our obligations. The 
sanctity of national symbols is protected by treating them gesturally as sacred, even when we insist in 
language that they are not. And when the god commands it, we must perform the ritual sacrifice, war, that 
sustains the group. 
To understand how war is ritual sacrifice, recall that the raw material of society is bodies. 
Organizing and disposing of them is the fundamental task of all societies. The social is quite literally 
constructed from the body and from specific bodies that are dedicated and used up for the purpose. The 
enduringness of any group depends at least partly on the willingness of us members to sacrifice 
themselves for the continuing life of the group. The creation of national or sectarian religious sentiment 
depends on a common secret, which is that the underlying cost of all society is the violent death of some 
portion of its members. There is more. Our deepest secret, the collective group taboo, is the knowledge 
that society depends on the death of this sacrificial group at the hands of the group itself. This is the totem 
principle concretized. According to Durkheim, the group becomes a group by agreeing not to disagree 
about the group-making principle. On what understanding of the group is this pact made? Durkheim never 
answered this question directly. Our answer is that the principle by which the group constitutes itself is 
manifest in collective victimage. 
 Why is it necessary to kill our own, and why can't we admit it? It is necessary, and we cannot 
admit it because violence poses the greatest threat to the group from within as well as without. It is never 
eradicated. Like sex, it can only be channeled. When violence starts, it can be prevented from spreading 
only if someone is willing to submit. Submission is the sacrificial principle. To keep violence from 
escalating and killing every member of the group, either by invasion from without or contagion within, 
group members agree to submit to a violent authority that punishes all who do not honor the totem's 
exclusive right to kill its own 5. Even when the enemy kills us, his transgression is not so much that he 
kills as that he kills us. Only totem authority—the group deity in sectarian terms, the group itself in 
Durkheimian terms—is so entitled. 
 If the totem may kill us, we are all at risk and all killers. This knowledge must be set apart from 
the group, for it suggests the frailty of group cohesion. We use the term taboo to describe the tension 
between the violent sacrificial mechanism that sustains enduring groups and the reluctance of group 
members to accept responsibility for enacting it. To protect themselves from acknowledging the source of 
group unity, citizens render totem violence and its symbols sacred. The knowledge that the group must 
sacrifice its own to survive is a secret. We keep it by treating violence as primitive and morally suspect, a 
failure of social structure rather than an elemental component6. Where violence exists, it is presented as a 
last resort, a challenge to civilized modernity as the hallmark of the nation-state. Thus, we avoid 
acknowledging in a thousand ways the true nature and object of totem power. 
For example, we tell ourselves that the purpose of war is to kill the enemy. And it is. But what 
keeps the group together and makes us feel unified is not the sacrifice of the enemy but the sacrifice of 
our own. If the ritual purpose of war were merely to kill the enemy, the deaths of some 40,000 or more 
Iraqis would have made a lasting contribution to American national unity. During the Persian Gulf war, 
notable for the ephemerality of its unifying effect, only 147 Americans died, a poor totem sacrifice. The 
two most unifying bloodlettings in American history, the Civil War and World War II, sacrificed the 
largest number of the nation's own, both absolutely and in proportion to the total population. We construct 
our identity from the flesh and blood of group members. All enduring groups, national or otherwise, rely 
on this sacrificial identity. 
The doctrine that provides the central experience of Christian faith is the sacrifice of an 
irreplaceable son by an all-powerful father whose will it was that the son should die violently. Ritually 
speaking, the sacrificial promise is that the father’s desire for blood revenge against those who offend his 
power will be satisfied for all time by this execution. Because history begins anew with this sacrifice, 
there need never be another. It has not turned out that way. The measure of the Christian believer's 
devotion to the faith remains his willingness to do as Jesus did and sacrifice himself. Willingness to 
sacrifice oneself, the ultimate sign of faith in social existence, is also the sign of the patriot, the proven 
and true member of the nation-group. We declare that we don't want death, that only the most compelling 
need justifies the death of our own. (And this is true. The compelling need is the survival of the group). 
Through successful sacrifice, internal hostilities are discharged, the group is unified. Then the cycle 
begins again. Those who worship the son who died at the heavenly father's command revere the totem 
principle, that only our own god has the right to kill our own, just as surely as those who revere the 
soldier son, who dies at the command of patriarchal generals. 
 In both sectarian and national religion the son's willing sacrifice is much admired, while the 
father's decision to sacrifice him is hidden. To say that Christians worship a violent father who sacrificed 
his own son may appear blasphemous to believers. The claim articulates the unspeakable totem principle. 
During the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, talk centered around whether the son, Bill Clinton, 
was a good son or not for refusing to submit to sacrifice in Vietnam. The discussion was never about 
whether George Bush had been a good father to send the sons to a bad war. That taboo discussion 
suggests the sense in which religions that counsel non-violence as a strategy are indistinguishable from 
those that do not. Both counsel the willing sacrifice of their followers to violence. Both are willing that 
devotees should die to demonstrate the viability and integrity of the totem principle that only their own 
god has the right to kill their own. Both understand that violence will not stop until someone is willing to 
submit. In the case of American nationalism, that god is the group symbolized in the totem fetish, the flag, 
and embodied in the totem leader, the President. 
The claim that violence, and only violence, produces enduring group unity is at odds with 
arguments that enlightened modern nations maintain order not chiefly by force but by other means. These 
include social pressure implemented by surveillance, a claim identified with Anthony Giddens, and a 
sense of group identity fostered by collective textual imagination, a notion championed by Benedict 
Anderson. To speak briefly to each surveillance without coercion would be toothless. Where surveillance 
compels response, its targets explicitly or implicitly recognize the physical force behind it. Second, not 
textual communities but communities of blood unite their members sacrificially. The holiest religious 
holidays do not celebrate literature but blood symbolically framed as birth or death. Texts may describe 
blood sacrifice and may be useful instruments in the formation of national consciousness for that reason. 
But textual communities do not physically fight for their members. Only communities bound by blood do 
this. 
What precipitates the large-scale ritual sacrifice we call war? Totem crisis, a term we adapt from 
Rene Girard's notion of sacrificial crisis, sets it in motion (39-67). A totem crisis occurs when there is 
uncertainty about the essential borders that demarcate our group. When territorial borders are breached 
and no longer differentiate Us from Them, there may be a totem crisis. Or there may be uncertainty 
because persons inside or outside the territorial border usurp the prerogative of the totem god and kill our 
own. In both conditions totem legitimacy is re-established only by sacrificing our own—in the successful 
case, enough of us to make an offering of real value Sacrifice restores totem authority and reconsolidates 
the group. This is why we die for the flag and commit our children to do so. To resolve totem crisis, the 
totem must re-create its exclusive killing authority out of the very flesh of its members. Blood is the 
group bond Blood sacrifice at the border, or war, is the holiest ritual of the nation-state7. 
To admit that we kill our own is unacceptable, for if there is not shared agreement about who will 
be sacrificed, violence may become chaotic instead of ordered; the group may be destroyed. To keep the 
sacrificial secret, an acceptable pretext to slaughter group members must be created. What Girard calls the 
ritual victim constitutes this pretext. In the nation-group context, this is the enemy. In addition to a ritual 
victim, a second or surrogate victim must stand in for members of our group against whom we have real 
grievances8. As a group we agree to kill members of a surrogate-victim sacrificial class expressly created 
for the purpose. Upon it we displace our anger at other members of our group. The ritual victim gives us 
an acceptable reason to kill our own. The surrogate victim is constituted in the portion of our group that 
we kill. The priestly class that trains for sacrifice at the hands of the nation-group is the military. Soldiers 
live apart in monastic orders that discipline and purify themselves for ultimate sacrifice. The knowledge 
that the true object of sacrificial violence is ourselves is separated from devotees, as sacred things are, 
whenever it threatens to surface explicitly. 
 What does successful ritual sacrifice accomplish? After enough bloodletting, the slate of internal 
hostilities is wiped clean. The group begins again. The external threat is met. Our bad feelings toward one 
another are purged. Time begins anew, space is re-consecrated. The group basks for a while in the 
unanimity of its effort, until internal hostilities accumulate once more, and the entire cycle must be 
repeated. Thus, what constitutes the nation in any moment is the memory of the last successful blood 
sacrifice that counts for living group members. In the United States this is World War II, fast receding in 
its effect as a national unifier as those who carry its body memory become a smaller and smaller 
proportion of the population. Lacking that memory, we must search for new sacrifices, while agonizing 
over our internal disunity. 
 Not all wars are successful blood sacrifice rituals. Some imperil rather than consolidate the group 
bond. Blood sacrifice rituals that give rise to enduring unity within the group must satisfy the following 
conditions. Since most do not, their success is qualified to that extent 
1. Blood sacrifice must touch or seem to touch every member of the group. It must be large 
enough for group members to recognize the cost to the group and to feel the pain of loss at a 
personal level. 
2. The sacrifice must be willing. Unwilling sacrifices may be reconstructed in death as having 
been willing, but the most useful sacrifice to the group declares in advance of leaving that he 
faces death willingly. Thus we say that soldiers "gave" their lives for the country. 
3. Victimage must be unanimous. This means that war must be popular. The entire group must 
collude in the secret that group unity comes from killing our own. Thus, Vietnam was not a 
successful ritual sacrifice. The totem secret could not be kept. 
4. Only undertakings that pose a serious risk to group survival have magical force for believers. 
At the outset the outcome of ritual effort must be genuinely uncertain. Great ritual uncertainty 
requires the most potent magic, which is blood. Of the 1944 Normandy invasion, an 
American journalist recalled, "The moment of the invasion was a great and solemn moment, 
it was a prayerful time. Because one didn't know. And everything was at stake, everything "9 
"When I think of the beaches of Normandy choked with the flower of American and British 
youth," Churchill told Eisenhower before the assault, "and when in my mind's eye I see the 
tides running red with their blood, I have my doubts I have my doubts "10 
5. Win or lose, the outcome of ritual effort must be clear and definite. Time and space must be 
redefined. History begins from this moment, territorial borders are re-created or reaffirmed. 
Time and space are consecrated anew, as if for the first time. This moment becomes the new 
beginning of the group, as World War II was for the generation of Americans now passing 
from the scene. 
6. Only another ritual can repair a failed ritual. It could be argued, for example, that the ritual 
failure of the Vietnam War precipitated the sacrifice of Richard Nixon as a sitting president in 
the Watergate scandal that resulted in his resignation. 
 
Media Ritual 
 
 All important things in society are ritualized. The prototype ritual of nation-state cohesion is 
popular war, though other rituals count. These include presidential elections, sending soldiers off to war, 
and welcoming them home again. These rituals also organize and express group identity, but blood 
sacrifice is the most potent. This is because it is body transforming. In the system of nationalism mass 
media perform the same functions that sacred and priestly texts perform in other religious systems. They 
recall central moments of group identity, rehearse ritual and mythic structures for believers, and pull from 
the flux of daily life what is grist for the mill of religious nationalism. The view that media are a reduced 
or corrupted ritual form is mistaken insofar as this is a claim that media rituals have replaced, badly, 
something else. The something else is blood sacrifice, the central rite of nation-groups. Media are 
instrumental in reporting blood sacrifice and assembling congregations. Congregants acquire knowledge 
of group threats and sacrificial occasions, and are socialized into the proper execution of ritual forms by 
media. Nationalism is the religion, among the vehicles available to ritualize it are media. Our central 
points about ritual as it pertains to nationalism are these 
 1. The purpose of ritual is to sustain the group by repeating (at various levels of intensity) the act 
of group creation. A successful ritual stops time at the perfect creation moment. It repeats and freezes the 
retrospectively golden moment when the group was created out of sacrifice. In this moment the debt to 
the bloodthirsty god was paid. The group was pristine. This was the moment when sacrifice was truly 
enough, when we were delivered from time and death. 
 2. Rituals may be contrived or opportunistic. The most powerful rituals of nation-group solidarity 
are opportunistic responses, such as war, to group threat. But opportunistic rituals are unpredictable in 
their occurrence and expensive in their prosecution. Their magic is great precisely because they are risky 
and costly. Contrived or pre-planned seasonal rituals fill in the intervals between opportunistic group-
forging rituals by rehearsing the drama of sacrifice and regeneration. American presidential elections are 
prototypic contrived rituals of sacrifice and regeneration. 
 3. Rituals have two major dynamics. They create the world by transforming chaos into cosmos, to 
use Mircea Eliade's terms, or they remodel and recall the transformation of chaos into cosmos. All rituals 
model and transform to one degree or another, but rituals may be classified by whether they are primarily 
transforming or commemorative. On the principle that the social is constructed out of the body, the most 
powerful rituals transform bodies directly. In relation to them media rituals are representational and 
commemorative. They do not have the power of blood sacrifice, but they do have a critical function. They 
re-present blood sacrifice that has occurred or is occurring and scan the environment for events that lend 
themselves to future blood sacrifice. Media preoccupation with violence speaks to their role in the ritual 
system of blood sacrifice. We stay in shape as a group by imposing ritual form on events of the world, 
large and small, as they offer themselves. Thus media constantly rehearse the structure of sacrifice and its 
supporting myths. Ritualized events focus group attention on threats to solidarity and help set in motion 
resolving rituals that work more or less well. In this way devotees ritually refurbish group solidarity and 
wait for the peculiar mix of events that signal more serious group threats. 
 
THE RABIN ASSASSINATION 
 
 The organizing structures that interest us are exclusive neither to the United States nor 
Christianity. They are totemic. The representation of national blood sacrifice in totem terms was visible 
on Israeli television following the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November, 
1995. We will briefly address some of its features. In the greater vulnerability of Israel's territorial 
boundaries and the loss of a traditional ritual enemy the Oslo peace accords posed a genuine totem crisis 
for Israelis. In the period leading up to Rabin's assassination that peril was ritually expressed in angry 
images of dissent portraying the Prime Minister in Palestinian headdress and, alternatively, in SS uniform 
Protest that blurred distinctions among group members and their historic enemies conveyed dissenters’ 
belief that traditional group boundaries and definitions were at risk. A vulnerable group may precipitate 
the sacrifice of a group leader who has staked his all on embodying it, though this sacrifice may take 
many forms besides assassination, including electoral defeat11. The bloody assassination of Rabin 
instantly became a ritual focus for renewing national unity and shoring up the group's sense of itself 
through demonstrations of collective rededication to the idea for which Rabin was assassinated. 
 Would the incremental unity achieved by the blood sacrifice of Yitzhak Rabin endure? The 
assassination was not a popular war in which the blood sacrifice of soldiers directly touches many 
families. But, as Prime Minister, Rabin had a para-family relationship to every member of the group. He 
was a willing sacrifice just as a soldier is, and for the same reason. As the most exalted member of the 
totem class, his job was to bear the burdens of the group and sacrifice himself to it when called to do so. 
Within hours of the assassination Acting Prime Minister Shimon Peres appeared on television to assure 
group members that the sacrifice had been willing. On the last day of his life, said Peres, the usually dour 
Prime Minister had been happy and serene. He had met his fate willingly. 
 A prominent element in the ritual re-presentation of the assassination was the lyric sheet for a 
peace song sung by the Prime Minister moments before his death. Blood from the fatal wounds soaked 
the lyric sheet. The story of this relic was endlessly repeated in media and recounted at the funeral by 
Rabin's closest aide, who displayed it for devotees. It performed the same ritual function as the flag 
soaked in battlefield blood of American sacrificial myth. Both embody the spirit of the soldier sacrificed 
for the group idea, in this case, peace with Israel's neighbors. 
 But the sacrifice was imperfect. Rabin's assassination was not unanimous victimage. Though his 
death may have been the real or fantasized wish of many group members, it was not the articulated 
resolve of the group, as in a popular war in which citizens are moved to declare that they offer their 
children for sacrifice. Imperfect sacrifice risks exposing the totem secret. The knowledge that the group 
cannibalizes itself to survive is group-threatening. Seven months after the assassination, Israelis 
overturned the labor government that had cast itself as inheriting Rabin’s policies. They did so uncertainly. 
Less than a single per cent of the vote separated the two major candidates. The sacrifice of Rabin, 
followed by a series of suicide bombings whose casualties were enough to imperil totem unity but not 
enough for full-scale war, left the country muddled and searching for a unifying vision. In totem terms the 
prognostication was that more sacrifice would be needed before a defining sacrifice could be declared. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Cohesion in enduring groups is accomplished within a framework of violence as a structural 
rather than contingent social force, religion as the truth that we are willing to die for, and the re- 
presentation of society to itself through blood sacrifice rituals performed on the bodies of supplicants. The 
most powerful expression of this religious framework in the United States, and not only there, is 
nationalism. On the surface, we deny nationalism's religious attributes and functions in order to keep the 
killing authority of the group from being challenged by sectarian faiths that have been stripped of the 
power to sacrifice the lives of devotees. When these faiths or others challenge totem power, a totem that 
wishes to endure must fend them off decisively. This means by killing its own, if necessary. If it does not 
act, a new enforcer may overthrow it. 
 Our analysis is not a brief in favor of violence or against it. It is an argument about the role of 
violence in organizing and maintaining enduring groups. It is clear that human beings suffer greatly from 
violence. The practice of non-violence does not avoid suffering or end violence, it redistributes both. 
Answering violence with non-violence may be no less painful and destructive in its effects on individuals 
and groups. Similarly, benefits may accompany either violence or non-violence in group unity and 
survival. It may be troubling to realize that there are no absolute formulas for achieving peace and 
goodness, such as total reliance on the precept never to act violently. In the language of sectarian religion, 
our dilemma is that we are never without sin, which is to say, violence, even when we give up our own 
bodies, or our children's, to the violence of others. The traditional esteem in which we hold nonviolent 
sacrifice to the forces of violence is misleading to this extent conventional interpretations of non-violence 
obscure and conceal the violent authority that demands sacrifice and perpetrates violence against 
supplicants or their perceived enemies, even when both parties offer themselves willingly. We are meant 
not to notice.  The secret keeps us together. 
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Those who reject the actuality of civil religion have done so on the grounds that American patriotism makes scant appeal to a supernatural 
metaphysics. They define religion as an explanatory system based in a cult of divine beings. The point of contention between those for whom 
civil religion usefully describes patriotic practices and those for whom it does not is the definition of the sacred. We contend that the doctrines 
and ceremonies of nationalism clearly reference the sacred. The divine beings invoked by national rituals are the dead totem fathers embodied in 
the flag. But this is not the only religious test a civil religion of patriotism satisfies George Kelly proposes that religion is 1) a justification and 
consolation for the most wrenching human tragedies, especially mortality, 2) a guide to one's dignity of place and meaning in the cosmos, 
especially in view of personal inadequacy and the need of expiation, and 3) a primary bond of social cohesion expressed in rituals or ceremonies 
that connect human beings to each other and the sacred. See Politics and Religious Consciousness in America (New Brunswick, NJ Transaction 
Books, 1984 11). Whether or not one approves of the answers, these are the questions to which nationalism addresses itself John Wilson argues 
that genuine religions exhibit five features that are absent from American civic piety. These are 1) cultic aspects, such as the provision for 
frequent ceremony and ritual, 2) recognized leadership offices invested with effective authority, 3) explicitly defined individual participation that 
establishes grounds for membership, 4) doctrines of correct belief, and 5) a coherence among these categories that makes the concept of religion 
applicable (John F Wilson, "The Status of 'Civil Religion' in America," The Religion of the Republic, ed by Elwyn A Smith Philadelphia Fortress 
Press, 1971 12). Nationalism supplies all these in abundance. Still, Kelly argues that the visible symbols "we would naturally attach to the 
common practice of a civil devotion have been more and more emptied of substance, commitment, and participation" (.Politics 237). It is hard to 
imagine that he could be thinking of the flag, imbued with symbolic substance as it is and commanding both commitment and participation. 
"Whatever else civil religion is," he continues, "with its penchant for communicative symbols and collective memory, it is not an indicator of the 
self-sacrifice of individuals" (Politics 239). On the contrary, self-sacrifice is the central theme of an American civil religion of patriotism 
organized around the flag. 
 
8 The contrast between the ritual and sacrificial victim is also Girard's, though he has not applied it to contemporary nation-state violence 
 
9 Richard Hottelet, CBS war correspondent, interview in "CBS Reports D-Day," May 26, 1994 
 
10 Quoted in Bruce W Neland, "Ike's Invasion," Time, June 6, 1994 40 “See, for example, Carolyn Marvin, "Fresh Blood, Public Meal," 
Communication Research 21/3 (June, 1994) 264-292 
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